Recent proposals for government support for the commercialization of shale oil : a review and analysis by unknown
TK1001
.E56
no. 77-003
Energy Laboratory Report
HITEL 77-003
RECENT PROPOSALS FOR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF SHALE OIL
A Review and Analysis
Policy Study Group
Date Published--May 20, 1977
Energy Laboratory Report
MIT-EL 77-003
Energy L'aboratory Report
MIT-EL 77-003
Standard Distribution
RECENT PROPOSALS FOR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF SHALE OIL
A Review and Analysis
by
Policy Study Group
Energy Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Date Published--May 20, 1977
PREPARED FOR THE UNITED STATES
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
Under Contract No. E(49-18) 2295
Task Order 6
"This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United
States government. Neither the United States nor the United States ERDA,
nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors,
or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes
any legal liability of responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed,
or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights."
ABSTRACT
This report is intended to accompany a paper prepared by the Policy
Study Group of the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory, entitled "Government Support
for the Commercialization of New Energy Technologies: An Analysis and
Exploration of the Issues". The paper was prepared for the U.S. Energy
Research and Development Administration and is referred to herein as "Issue
Paper". 1
The Issue Paper discusses the general principles of government-supported
commercialization programs. This report applies those principles to a
specific case, that of a proposed program for the commercial demonstration
of shale oil production. This case has significance as a result
of the national goal of greater energy independence.
The report begins with a brief discussion of a proposed commercial
demonstration program, followed by a section that sketches the historical,
technological and economic background of shale oil. The commercial implica-
tions of this background are discussed in the next section. Based on this
information, the report then outlines probable industry action in the shale
oil field if no government action were taken. The next section discusses
rationales for the proposed program, both those explicitly offered by the
government and others that could have been offered. The program is then
evaluated for its effectiveness in dealing with the various problems
involved in starting and maintaining a commercially viable shale oil
industry. The findings of the analysis are summarized in the final section.
'MIT Energy Laboratory Report MIT-EL 76-009, November 1976. Prepared
under Contract No. E(49-18) 2295, Task Order 6.

iii
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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Presently (May 1977) energy policy is being debated, and the future role of
commercial demonstrations in synthetic fuels has yet to be defined. Therefore, an
analysis of the shale oil proposal as it stood at the end of 1976 should be helpful
in the development and assessment of future programs in the synthetic fuel area.
The methods of analysis developed in the Issue Paper are used. Additional
techniques are also introduced where appropriate. Certain conclusions are reached
regarding the attractiveness of the commercial demonstration program for oil shale
development as outlined in "Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program" by the
Synfuels Interagency Task Force. These results should not be compared to existing
analyses of alternate synthetic fuels commercialization programs, nor used to
evaluate a program with a different goal or structure in the oil shale area. It is
the opinion of the authors that an analysis of this kind of alternate synthetic
fuels technologies might well yield similar results. Further, there may be very
real informational gaps concerning oil shale mining and technology which could
best be filled by a program which, at least superficially, would appear very similar
to the proposed commercial demonstration program. This type of effort would,
however, involve government involvement in what has been classed the "development"
1
"Recommendations for a Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program", Report
Submitted by Synfuels Interagency Task Force to The President's Energy
Resources Council, November, 1975.
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SUMMARY
The sheer quantity of oil that physically could be produced from U.S. oil
shale draws attention to this possibility as an alternative to increasing U.S.
dependency on oil imports. However, the barriers to significant industrial
production of shale oil are substantial. In addition to uncertainties in the
technological, institutional, and environmental areas, the overriding barrier
is that of expected cost relative to expected price of direct substitutes.
In 1976 ERDA proposed a Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program which would
offer government incentives encouraging the private sector to build a few
commercial-scale shale oil plants for the purpose of reducing uncertainties.
The expectation was that the reduction of these uncertainties would result in
massive replication of these plants by the private sector, thus bringing into
being a new industry which would produce shale oil in quantities that would be
significant relative to the nation's total energy needs. Under the present
administration, the future of this kind of proposal is not clear.
The crucial question around which ERDA's proposal revolved is this:
Would the Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program remove the block which prevents
the private sector from building a significant shale oil industry over the next
ten to twenty years?
The analysis presented here indicates that the Synthetic Fuel Commercialization
Program could probably reduce technological uncertainty somewhat, that it would
perhaps give useful but limited information on the institutional and environmental
risks, but that it does not deal at all with the crucial factor that (even with
2reduced technological uncertainty) expected costs are simply too high relative
to expected prices for the private sector to be intensively and extensively
drawn into the building of a significant industry.
Therefore, it can be expected that the Synthetic Fuels Commercialization
Program as proposed in 1976 would have little if any effect on the creation of
a significant shale oil industry over the next decade or two. This appendix
is offered as guidance in the preparation of future programs.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SHALE OIL
To date, the nation's principal stated energy goal has been a significant
reduction in dependence on foreign oil. The major reason for government and
industry interest in the development of shale oil is the large size of higher-
grade shale oil resources in the United States.
The relative abundance of domestic fossil fuel raw materials is shown
in Table 1. While there is, in general, little controversy over absolute
quantities of resources, reserves are defined as quantities that are econom-
ically recoverable at some given price level. In the case of synthetic fuels
raw materials we list under "proved reserves" that portion of the appropriate
resources that could presumably be recovered at a cost approximately equal to
that used as a basis for present process economics.
The following data may help to put these quantities into perspective,
and illustrate the reason for the high level of interest in shale and coal
as energy sources. At close to current real price levels, the reserve of
coal available is 15 times the total U.S. energy consumption in 1974 and at
current coal consumption rates (15% of total energy demand) would last for 100
years. Oil available from high grade shale is 16 times current total energy
consumption. These multipliers stimulate interest in and of themselves, since
the reserve of oil and of gas at current prices is only five times the total
1974 energy consumption.
Table 1
U.S. Fossil Fuel Resources
Billions Barrel Oil Equ. 1
I II III IV2 3 4Raw Material Total Identified Deposits of Reserves
Remaining Resources Interest
Lignite 933 253
Sub-bituminous 1200 300
Bituminous 2500 633 183(all coals) 5
Anthracite 97 23
High Grade Oil Shale 6  600 418 2097
Medium Grade Oil Shale 8  1600 0 0
Tar Sands (U.S.) 2 .6 nil
Athabasca Tar Sands
(Alberta-, Canada) 650 325 709
U.S. Natural Gas 1 0  83 81 65
U.S. Petroleum1 1  40012 200 62
Notes:
Adapted from: Ogden H. Hammond and Robert E. Baron, "Synthetic Fuels: Price,
Prospects, and Prior Art", American Scientist, 64 (July, August 1976) 407-417.
Calculated from Averitt, Paul. 1973. Coal. United States Mineral Resources,
Geological Survey Professional Paper 820, Dept. of the Interior.,
Duncan,D.C., and V.E. Swanson. 1965. Organic-Rich Shale of the United States
and World Land Areas. U.S. Geological Survey Circular 523., Kirk-Othmer.
1969. Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology, Vol.19,2nd ed.N.Y: Interscience
Publishers., Geological Estimates of Undiscovered Recoverable Oil and Gas
Resources in the U.S., Geological Survey Circular 725, 1975.
2.2. Known and identified deposits of a given substance, regardless of whether
they are high or low grades, in an accessible or inaccessible location,
commercially attractive or not.
Notes for Table 1
3. "Interest" is rather artibrarily defined as: Lignite and sub-bituminous
coal seams more than 10 ft. thick, less than 1000 ft. overburden;
Anthracite and bituminous coals seams more than 42" thick, less than 1000
ft. overburden; Oil shale yielding 25-100 gallons/ton, zones more than
100 ft. thick; Tar sands containing at least 12% bitumin; Gas and
petroleum - total resources in fields which are presently considered
commercially attractive.
4. Commercially recoverable at close to current price levels and with
present technology, except for shale oil (see note 5 below).
5. 10.7 x 109 tons available from underground mining from strip mining.
6.6. 25-100 gallons per ton.
7. Assumes 50% mining extraction of resources of commercial interest,
assuming economic viability of shale oil processing.
8.8. 10-25 gallons per ton.
9. Overburden ratio of less than 1.0.
10. Assumes .8 recovery factor.
11. Assumes .32 recovery factor.
12.
Includes oil not recovered from abandoned fields.
The oil shale reserves that form a basis for interest in synthetic fuel
seem to be as large or larger than the coal reserves that lend themselves to
utilization as synthetic fuel. A further reason for interest in oil shale
processing lies in the fact that processes for the production of synthetic
fuels from oil shale appear cheaper than those that start from coal. This is
primarily because oil shale contains a very much higher ratio of hydrogen to
carbon (Table 2), and process costs tend to directly correlate with the in-
crease in the net H/C ratio required. This cost advantage is somewhat offset
by increased materials handling required by shale. It is anticipated that most
liquid synfuels should be produced from shale.
1.2 THE PROPOSED SHALE OIL COMMERCIALIZATION PROGRAM
The proposed government programwas based on two premises: First, that
domestic oil and gas production has been declining since the early 1970's, and
new oil and gas discoveries and production, increased energy conservation, ex-
pansion of nuclear power capacity, and greater direct burning of coal can only
supplement this declining energy supply but not adequately replace it; and,
second, that dependence on foreign oil and gas will continue to grow after
1990 without substantial production of synfuels. 2
1
"Recommendations for a Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program", Synfuels
Interagency Task Force Report to The President's Energy Resources Council,
November 1975, Vol. II, p. 18, Fig. 8, p. H-27.
2U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, "Proposed Synthetic Fuels
Commercial Demonstration Program Fact Book", March 1976, p.1.
The Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program was a major near-term step
growing from these premises, the "...first important step toward the development
of a synthetic fuels industry..." The major objective of this program was to
gain early information and experience; it would also provide small quantities
of additional energy, and would demonstrate"...U.S. capability to tap its vast
resources."
The Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program strategy reflects a deter-
mination to "rely upon the private sector and market forces as the most
efficient means of achieving the nation's goals, but act through the government
where the private sector is unable to achieve our goals."2 The strategy has
two parts: First, to offer incentives of loan guarantees and guaranteed prices,
for two or three demonstration projects, so that the projects are, in themselves,
attractive business ventures for the private sector. And, second, to make
available to the entire private sector all of the results of the demonstration
project.
The whole thrust of the government program was to enable private development
of large scale production capacity by 1995, which the Task Force reported would
be "unlikely" without its intervention. It was presumed that large scale produc-
tion will be "needed" and "competitive" by then. The major government assistance
in the case of shale oil would be in the form of loan and price guarantees, to
"overcome existing financial uncertainty." 3
"'Fact Book", op cit, p.2.
2president Ford's 1976 Energy Message, cited in ERDA 76-1, p. vii. ("A National
Plan for Energy Research Development and Demonstration: Creating Energy Choices
for the Future, 1976". Volume 1: The Plan, April 15, 1976.)
3
"Fact Book", op cit, p. D-1.
8Table 2
Typical Compositions
Net H/C Atomic Ratio 2 S/C Atomic Ratio N/C Atomic Ratio
Methane (CH4 )
Gasoline ((CH 2 ) N)
Colorado Shale Oil
Athabasca Tar Sands
Bituminous Coal
Sub-bituminous Coal
Lignite
Anthracite
Crude Oil
Handbook of Chemistry, Edited by Norbert A.
Book Co., Tenth Edition, 1967.
Seventh World Petroleum Congress Proceedings
Company Limited, Vol. 3, 1967.
Lange, McGraw-Hill
, Elsevier Publishing
2This assumes that all oxygen and sulfur present in the coal are in the
form of H20 and H2S. All such hydrogen is excluded from the calculation.
1.58
1.50
.6
.5
.25
.05
1.6-1.9
.019
.019
.016
.007
.005
.004
variable
.028
.004
.018
.016
.015
.001
variable
Source:
"Except for the very largest firms (i.e., major oil companies, etc.),
capital availability is a substantial barrier. Risk to capital or an inadequate
or uncertain return on investment is a major concern for all potential producers.
Note that only unregulated firms were determined to be viable potential pro-
ducers of these synthetic fuel types (e.g., shale oil)."l
The government's commercial demonstration program stressed loan guarantees
and in some cases provided for construction grants of portions of the project
cost as well as price guarantees. Other possible mechanisms might include
government equity (as has happened with investment by the Canadian federal
and provincial governments in the Syncrude Project in the Athabasca tar sands).
These tools are discussed in the Issue Paper, (Section 4.4).
The proposed program for shale oil commercial demonstration called for a
competitively bid package of price-supports and loan guarantees of up to 50%
of project costs. Congress was requested to authorize loan guarantees to
initiate the commercialization program, which was expected to provide 350,000
B/D by the early 1980's (6-8 demonstration plants) and was hoped to lead
to an unsupported industry which would provide 5,000,000 B/D by 1995 (100 major
plants). 2
The expansion to 5 MM B/D was supposed to follow naturally from the
Commercial Demonstration program: i.e., by the reduction in synfuels costs as
a result of movement along the learning curve, and by the reduction of un-
certainties resulting in reduced required rates of return. In other words,
the purpose of the program is to lower the costs of synfuels.
I"Fact Book", op cit, p. F-2.
2
"Fact Book", op cit., p. 2 and A-l. Figures refer to all synfuels.
The government's programwas based on two key assumptions about the likely
future competitiveness of shale oil: One, that shale oil is competitive with
today's world oil price of $13-14/B or that it will become competitive within
the next ten years, and, second, that synfuels will become increasingly
attractive economically as world oil prices increase during and after the late
1980's. Nevertheless, program analysis assumes that industry is not likely
to invest significantly in synthetic fuel plants because of present uncer-
tainties about future costs and future world oil prices, the large amount of
capital to be risked, and the risk of major project delays.2 Therefore
the goal of the proposed Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Progam was the removal
of these barriers to what should otherwise be a viable industry.
1"Fact Book" op cit, pB-l
'Fact Book", op cit, p.B-l.
-
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2. BACKGROUND
In order to understand and evaluate the proposed commercial demonstration
program for shale oil, it is necessary to know something of the historical
and technological context.
2.1 HISTORY
Oil shale processing has been practiced on an industrial scale since the
1860's. Production of 2,500 B/D was maintained by the Scottish oil shale
industry for long periods of time over its 100-year history: 780,000 barrels
were produced in 1952. A Manchurian oil shale industry, begun in 1929,
reached outputs of 1.3 MM B/yr while under Japanese control during World
War II. The Communist Chinese expanded the Manchurian operation, and output
during the Korean War is believed to have exceeded 14 MM B/yr, with production
rates as high as 40 MB/D.1
During the 1960's,shale oil R&D was being carried on at a low level by
several of the major oil companies, and by The Oil Shale Company, (TOSCO),
newly formed expressly to become a major factor in a new shale oil industry.
With the announcement of the sale of U.S. Government shale leases in Utah
and Colorado in early 1974, the level of R&D was increased somewhat.
This lease sale, taking place at the height of the 1973-74 Arab oil
embargo, elicited over 1/2 billion dollars in bids from several major oil
companies plus TOSCO. These companies appear to have been acting largely on
IOgden H. Hammond and Robert E. Baron, op cit.
mlii~IiI i,
the belief that some combination of the following conditions would obtain:
(1) world oil prices would continue to rise, and the cost of shale oil produc-
tion would be at a level that would make the industry viable at world oil prices,
and/or (2) shale oil would be "needed", and therefore prices would be paid
that would make its production profitable, regardless of the market prices
and costs, and/or (3) the government would take whatever steps might be
necessary to ensure that the necessary technology and regulatory environment
would be available, and that Federal funds would be available if needed, to
subsidize construction of the early plants.1
Since the lease sale, each of the lessees has been conducting engineering
and feasibility studies, studying environmental impact, etc., but little real
progress has been made in either the technology or the conceptual development
of the shale oil industry with the possible exception of the Occidental
in-situ process. As of this writing, all Federal lease holders have requested
and received suspension of their leases. No projects are proceeding on the
private and state lands. The Colony project (on private land in Colorado)
seemed ready to proceed, but then stopped. Occidental appears to be con-
templating proceeding with their in-situ process on a commercial scale, but
no factual data on this point areavailable, beyond the fact that they have
recently acquired Federal Tract C b from Ashland-Shell. Declining interest
during this three year period is the result primarily of rapidly escalating
anticipated construction costs, and lower than anticipated oil prices, both
domestic and world.
See Exhibit B, "Shale Oil Production Costs and the Need for Incentives for
Pioneer Plant Construction", J.A. Whitcombe et al, TOSCO, Feb. 1-3, 1976.
- ---- IYIYYIII
2.2 TECHNOLOGY
Oil shale processing technology is basically simple. Oil shale contains
a carbonaceous material called "kerogen". When oil shale is heated in an
8000 F. retort, the kerogen decomposes (pyrolyzes) to yield a raw synthetic
crude oil (shale oil), and gas: some residual carbon remains in the shale.
The solid residue which remains after retorting is known as spent shale. The
crude shale oil is relatively high in sulfur and nitrogen content. Typical
U.S. shales under consideration yield up to 35 gallons of shale oil per ton.
A typical shale processing method (the TOSCO II process) is illustrated
in Figure 1. In this type of processing, the most widely discussed one,
crushed oil shale is pyrolyzed in the first stage of a retort. The heat for
pyrolysis is supplied from hot solid materials which were heated in an external
heater. The spent shale and solid material are cooled in the second stage
of the retort by cool by-product gas. The gases produced by retorting are
not diluted by nitrogen, and thus are more desirable than from other processes.
In other processing methods the heat is supplied by the combustion of
by-product gases and carbon remaining on the spent shale in a separate stage
of the retort, or by a gas stream heated in an external heater. A combined
mining and in-situ process is being evaluated by The Garrett Research and
Development Company. Their process would mine an underground chamber, blast
the ceiling to fill the room with broken shale, then burn part of the shale
to provide heat for retorting. The liquids would be recovered from channels
drilled in the chamber floor.
Regardless of the retorting method used, the resulting shale oil is
then "fractionated" (distilled) to separate it into various grades and then
"hydrotreated" to reduce nitrogen and sulfur levels. The relatively small
il IlIMil, IiM II I I I Iiim Iillll
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FIGURE 1
oil shale -
intermediate 8TU raw
by-product
gas T_
shale oil
cooled
combustion
air + fuel
cooled solid material
spent shale spent
shale
amount of oil per ton of shale means that there are substantial technical
problems resulting from the sheer volume of rock that must be mined and trans-
ported to a commercial scale processing plant. Furthermore, since the shale
expands by as much as 50% during crushing, the volume of spent shale to be
disposed of is greater than the volume of shale that was mined. Spent shale
has a high content of alkali minerals, a factor that must be considered in
the disposal process.
Oil shale processing currently requires from one to three barrels of
water per barrel of shale oil produced. This water is used in the shale
processing itself, as well as for dust control and reduction of the alkalinity
of the spent shale.
3. PROBLEMS IN CREATING A SHALE OIL INDUSTRY
3.1 TECHNOLOGY
The major technological difficulties inherent in oil shale processing
are caused by the large scale on which such an industry would have to work in
terms of mining and materials handling. Since no large scale units have yet
been built, unforeseen technological difficulties are likely. As presently
perceived for example, a 50 MB/D shale oil plant would utilize 6 to 15 separate
retorts of 3M - 8M B/D capacity each. Retorts built to date are about one
tenth that size.
The oil shale industry envisioned by the government in the 1976 proposal
would be of the size to accomplish significant progress toward the goal of
"energy independence." The 5 MM B/D projected synfuels production by 1995 from
an unsubsidized industry is about half of the current daily domestic production
rate of natural crude oil. An industry of this size will require mines on a scale
three times larger than that of the entire present U.S. coal mining industry,
the handling and disposal of 6 million tons of solids per day, retorting and
refining oil on a scale only handled by the larger oil companies, a full-scale
distribution system where only a minute one exists (because oil shale is located
geographically far outside of the existing petroleum network), and a marketing
system to sell the shale oil product.
It would be helpful to get some concept of the size of a 50 M B/D shale
oil plant, the size commonly recognized as minimum "commercial scale". By
petroleum industry standards, the output is small. For comparison, 59% of
the crude refined in the U.S. is refined in refineries larger than 100 M B/D,
and 32% in refineries larger than 200 M B/D. 1
On the other hand, by mining standards, a 50 M B/D shale oil plant is
huge. For comparison, it would require handling approximately 70,000 T/D
(assuming 30 gallons/ton) of oil shale, which is comparable in materials
handled to the output of three very large coal mines. It should be noted that
the materials handling problem is actually double that of a conventional
mining operation: not only must the raw shale be mined and processed but the
spent shale - of at least equivalent volume - must be disposed of.
While it is normal for mining operations to handle some "tailings", very
few have to handle larger tailings streams than the input one. Those that do
are usually recovering very high value low volume minerals - such as gold,
diamonds, and uranium. Certainly existing mines do not normally handle the
enormous quantity of material that would be generated as tailings by one oil
shale operation.
Mining is viewed as a relatively problem-free area by many shale engineers,
but it should be pointed out that significant unresolved technological un-
certainties exist in the mining of shale. These include, but are not limited
to, such problems as saline aquifiers, H2S and CHq in underground mines,
unknown and uncertain geology (with particular reference to rock mechanics),
interaction and/or interference with existing surface and ground water
1
As of 1/1/75, "NPRA U.S. Refining Capacity Survey". 9/23/75.
systems, etc. Disposal problems, resulting from the need to dispose of large
quantities of spent shale, may also be serious. These problems are complicated
by the shale chemistry and the climatic peculiarities of the proposed mine
sites. The shale expands upon crushing - hence cannot entirely be replaced
in the mine. The spent shale contains substantial amounts of soluble alkalis
which could be leached out by ground water. The mine sites are hilly, arid,
and criss-crossed by canyons and gorges. Rainfall is sparse and most comes
in the form of cloudbursts. These conditions do not favor strip mining and/or
disposal of the spent shale. The situation is further compounded by the
fact that most relatively rich and accessible shale deposits lie within the
State of Colorado, which places strong premium upon high environmental
standards, and by the fact that the limited high quality water supplies avail-
able are the subject of much regulation.
However, it is not likely that all environmental problems can be dealt
with that effectively, nor that it would solve all regulatory issues if they
could be. Even a mature industry, such as strip mining of coal, faces a
rapidly changing set of regulations. Even if some of the alkali minerals can
be removed from spent shale, the huge quantities of material to be dealt with
in shale oil production suggest that changing environmental restrictions will
have a significant impact for decades--indeed throughout the life of the
industry.
A partial solution to these problems may be found in the recovery of the
alkali minerals as potentially valuable by-products. Superior Oil is
pursuing this possibility and has reported an additional benefit--i.e., a
reduction in volume of the processed shale by as much as 50%, which may
permit the return of the spent shale to the mine.
Because of the instabilities and very high pour point (melting point) of
hydrotreated shale oil, it is likely that shale oil will be refined reasonably
close to the production facilities. Thus new refineries would have to be
constructed, and these refineries should be of an economic size.
3.2 ECONOMICS
Shale oil has always seemed to be on the verge of being competitive with
crude oil. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the fact that shale oil has not
been exploited in the past that it has not been competitive with existing
energy sources. Costs per barrel (or equivalent) currently encountered for
various energy sources presently fall within the following ranges:
Thus, costs
oil prices,
Traditional oil and gas $ 1 - 5/B
Frontier oil and gas 5 -14
Shale oil 15 -30
Oil from coal 15 -30
High Btu gas from coal 20 -35
for shale oil and other synthetics are higher than current world
which are now in the neighborhood of $13/B delivered to U.S. shores.
Price in 1976 dollars corresponding to present proved reserves.
A shale oil plant requires a tremendous investment. The
for a 50 M B/D shale oil plant has been estimated as follows:1
gross investment
Gross Investment TOSCO
Million $/Dail)
of $ Barrel
Mining 265 b  6,150
Retorting 370 b  8,550
Upgrading 18 5 b 4,300
Other 140 3,250
960 22,200
a Developed by the authors from
b Calculated.
c Detail not available.
Shell
Million $/Daily
of $ Barrel
See Note c See Note
See Note c See Note
See Note c See Note
See Note c See Note
1,200 27,900
private communications.
Authorsa
Million $/Daily
of $ Barrel
425 8,500
600 12,000
300 6,000
225 4,500
1,550 31,000
By comparison, offshore Louisiana oil and gas production presently require an
investment of about $1500-2000 for each daily barrel of peak production. The
absolute size of the investment required for a single 50 M B/D plant is so
large that only companies the size of an Exxon or a General Motors could be
expected to build multiple units. The result is that the impact on the
company of a significant variation in costs from the expected mean is much
larger than for a situation in which a company makes multiple small investments,
even though the sum of the multiple investments may equal the single larger
investments. Furthermore, the absolute magnitude of any such deviation might
easily be catastrophic. All of this increases substantially the risks involved,
at least as it is perceived by potential investors. Presumably, at least in
the long run, if the profitability is large enough, ways will be found to
accumulate the necessary capital, even if the formation of new organizational
structures are required; however, such formation, if required, could cause
significant delays.
IFor source, see discussion on page 25.
In addition, the investment expenditures for shale oil must be made very
early, relative to the time that significant volume of product can be produced.
This is shown on Figure 2, where percent of capital expenditure is plotted
against time; for comparison, the same plot is made for conventional oil.
The area between the two curves is a measure of the "front end loading"
of a plant, that is, the requirement for spending huge quantities of cash far
in advance of the time benefits can be derived from the expenditure. This
front end loading results in large opportunity costs associated with the
invested capital, which are largely incurred before start-up, and which must
be recovered through the price of the product after start-up.
Operating expense for shale oil is also high, and can be broken down in
the following way:1
TOSCO Shell Authorsa
Mining See Note b See Note b 3
Retorting See Note b See Note b 3
Upgrading See Note b See Note b 1.23
Other See Note b See Note b .25
4.77 2.50
a Developed by the authors from private communications.
b Detail not available.
These are out-of-pocket operating costs and thus are exclusive of any capital
recovery, interest or profit. Comparable offshore Louisiana operating costs
amount to about $.50 - $1.00/B.
1For source, see discussion on page 25.
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There are several reasons for thinking that the capital costs on Page 21
are on the low side: No provision is made for regulatory or legal delays, or
for extraordinary operating delays, or technical difficulties resulting in a
lowered stream factor. Also, costs in the construction industry in general
and the process industry in particular have been escalating significantly
faster than the inflation rate. l  For example, the estimated costs of shale
oil plant construction have been escalating about 20%/year for the past three
years, without any significant design changes. There is no reliable way of
estimating how long this trend will continue. In addition, although these
estimates include provision for waste disposal and environmental control,
it is expected that restrictions in this area can only get more severe.
Just as it may be difficult to appreciate the physical scale problems
of oil shale processing, so may its financial magnitude be difficult to
grasp. A 50 M B/D plant, which, as we have seen, is not large by refining
standards, would still cost in the neighborhood of one and a half billion
dollars. Such a plant, if a separate corporation, would rank 110th on the
"Fortune 500", in order of assets. It would be naive, indeed, to consider
such a plant as "just another investment", in view of its financial size and
of the need for a hundred or more for an industry of significant size.
Faltermayer,Edmund, "The Hyperinflation in Plant Construction",Fortune,
November 1975, p. 102 ff.
The long-term goal for the new industry envisioned by the Synthetic
Fuels Commercialization Program is 5 million barrels of total synfuels per
day in 1995. In 1976 dollars, this amounts to an investment of $150 billion
assuming $31,000 per daily barrel. This figure is somewhat larger than the
present combined assets of the 13 largest U.S. oil companies ($138 billion).
This is not to imply that an industry of such magnitude cannot be developed
over an 18-1/2 year period of time, but the extremely rapid nature of the
proposed growth must be understood. A growth from 350 M B/D in 1985 to
5,000 M B/D in 1995 is a compound annual growth rate of 30%. Such a very
high growth has taken place in the past in a few major industries, but only
with very large economic incentives. Given a construction lead-time of over
six and one-half years, all investment must be initiated by 1989, and the
first demonstration plant could not be onstream before 1983. This leaves
very little time for assimilation effects, and also very little time for
resolution of regulatory and environmental issues that are site specific
with respect to these plants.
The fact that there are no commercial scale shale processing plants
now operating or planned argues that U.S. energy prices are too low to make
production of shale oil attractive. Data furnished by major companies
provide the relation between desired after tax rates of return and prices for
hydrotreated syncrude: this is shown in Table 3.
1
"Fact Book" op cit, p.A-l. This cost per daily barrel is for shale oil; it
can reasonably be expected that costs for other synfuels will be at least
as high or higher.
Other estimates of hydrotreated2 shale oil costs are shown in Table 3.
Shell predicts a cost of $20.10 (1976) at a 10% DCF after tax for hydro-
treated shale oil. No severence taxes are considered in this estimate, but
plant size and other basic assumptions are similar.
TOSCO's estimate completed at a somewhat earlier point in time
(September 1975) predicts a capital cost of $960 million for an equivalent size
plant (48,000 BPSD). Cost of oil shale reserve acquisition is lower than that
assumed in the other estimates presented. No opportunity cost for money
committed during the lengthy construction period appears to be assessed.
This results in an understatement of cost of at least 10%. The resulting
price for a 10% discounted rate of return after tax is $14.20 per barrel in
1975 dollars.
It is important to realize that all oil shale cost estimates include
the cost of oil shale reserve acquisition. Since the majority of oil shale
reserves are on public land, these payments are made to the Federal or state
government. From an economic viewpoint, such payments are rents and should
be zero if the resource is only marginally economic. In fact, however, the
impact of these rents on projected shale oil costs is significant on the
order of $4.00/bbl at a 10% DCF. From an economic efficiency viewpoint, a
government program refunding these rents would be desirable. Politically,
however, such a move might well be extremely distasteful. The value of oil
shale reserves, from a public viewpoint, has been established by the high
bids based on optimistic estimates. Any reduction in the rents payable for
1Derived from "C-b Shale Oil Project", Shell & Ashland Oil and "Shale Oil
Production Costs and the Need for Incentives for Pioneer Plant Construction"
Whitcombe, Vawfer and Matter, TOSCO. Authors' figures were developed by MIT
Energy Lab based on data furnished in private communication.
2 As discussed above, hydrotreating is the hydrogen treatment process required
to upgrade raw shale oil and reserve sulfur and nitrogen.
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these or comparable reserves is sure to be viewed as an exploitation of the
public by the oil shale developers - and hence will not be allowed to occur.
This is unfortunate, as oil shale processes begin to closely approach
feasibility if such rents were eliminated.
.... l UII0IIII 1Pfw llllMIIi iI
Table 3
Shale Oil Economics
Internal After Tax Rate of Return
5%
10%
15%
20%
TOSCO Shell
Required Price per Bbl (1976
- $12.00
$14.20 20.10
21.70 29.40
Authors
constant dollars)
-
$21.76
31.60
44.75
Assumptions: Capital Cost In 1976 $'s: $1.5 billion Authors, $.960 billion TOSCO,
$1.2 billion* Shell
Construction time (from lease initiation): 6.5 years.
Capacity: 50,000 barrels per stream day
Stream factor: 90%
Tax laws: Pre-September, 1976
Depletion allowance, state & federal, assumed (15%) Federal
Federal Minimum Tax: 10% (on tax preference items such as
depletion allowances)
Location: Colorado
No Federal or State Subsidies
Compliance with Environmental
Retorting Technology: TOSCO
Life of Project: 42 years.
20 years.
30 years.
Standards as they existed in 1975
II
Authors (from reserve acquisition)
Shell (from start-up)
TOSCO (from start-up)
*Estimated
In addition to the high prices required to make shale processing
economically viable, the shale oil industry is, as discussed above, heavily
front-end loaded. The major expenditures must be made several years in
advance of any benefits to be derived from them. This fact has a significant
impact on the risks involved in shale processing.
For example, risks are inherently magnified, the greater the time span
between the expenditure and the benefits. This greater time span has the
effect of giving any particular risk a greater leverage on the attractiveness
of the project as a whole. For example, reference to Figure 2 illustrates
that a decision to abort a shale oil project at a point when 10% of the
ultimate daily production rate had been achieved would still result in an
unrecoverable expenditure of 94% of the total investments.
Also, companies and regulatory agencies lack analytical tools and
conceptual frameworks for dealing adequately with inflation in the range
above, say 6% or 8% per year, particularly when expenditures and revenues are
separated by time in the order of a decade as they would be in the case of
shale oil plants. In the accounting, tax, fiscal, monetary, investment, and
commercial areas, this whole issue is presently in a turmoil. (For example,
in substantial inflation, book depreciation based on historical costs be-
comes increasingly irrelevant, and the depreciation tax shield becomes
increasingly ineffective.) All of this adds significantly to the risks
involved.
Vancil, R.F., "Inflation Accounting--The Great Controversy", Harvard Business
Review, March - April 1976.
Even without inflation there are conflicting perspectives from which to
view the economic viability of a project where large expenditures and
significant benefits are so far separated in time. For example, a shale oil
plant would report (using conventional commercial and financial parameters)
return on investments as shown in Figure 3, assuming a constant shale oil
price calculated to yield a 10% DCF. Note that the ROI in year 25 is 30%
2
and in year 40 is 500%. Plots of ROE, return on net employed assets, etc.,
would show similar results, and are very likely to give the impression of
extremely high profitability, leading possibly to "excess" profits taxes.
This would be of particular concern in industry such as this, which is sure
to be under public scrutiny. For example, because of the heavy accounting
bias of significant segments of the regulatory and financial communities,
there would be significant risk of the taxing away of what would show on
the ledgers in later year as "excess profits".
A conventionally employed parameter defined as the profit in a particular
year divided by the net book value in that same year.
2A conventionally employed parameter defined as the profit in a particular
year divided by the net book value of the equity in that same year.
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4. PROBABLE INDUSTRY ACTION WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
To evaluate the Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program we need to
understand what would happen without any government action, for the costs of
the government program must be measured against the benefits of its effects.
4.1 COST UNCERTAINTY
As has been mentioned, there is currently a very low level of private
sector activity in the development of shale oil as an alternative energy
source, which suggests that it is not perceived as commercially attractive,
given the high costs discussed in the previous section. However, there is
some feeling that the real price of crude oil will rise to well above $25
per barrel (1976$) between 1985 and 1995. Such an increase might make shale
oil an attractive proposition, (i.e., give 12.5% return after tax per
Table 3) if political factors do not reduce the potential profits.
4.2 PRICE UNCERTAINTY
Even disregarding political factors, though, it is highly possible that
market forces alone would make shale oil unattractive, even at substantially
higher price levels. There are several reasons why this can happen. First
the extreme capital intensity of shale processing makes it vulnerable to
cost increases. For example, it was believed that oil shale would be viable
when, after the oil embargo, the real price of crude increased dramatically.
Construction costs for shale oil-capital equipment proceeded to escalate
at about 20% (nominal) per year. Since shale oil (like all synthetics)
requires huge capital investments, this effectively placed it out of
The government presently proposes to allow shale oil price to equate to world
oil price. This would shift the uncertainty somewhat.
contention. There is a possibility that this same sequence of events might
occur again, if the international price of oil does increase sharply.
Second, at the very high oil prices necessary for shale oil to be viable,
a significant increase in supply from other sources would be expected (e.g.,
assuming U.S. energy prices follow world oil prices, and that world oil prices
rise significantly). Not only would new exploration produce substantial
quantities of oil and gas, but tertiary recovery technologies would become
increasingly economically viable, so that the private sector would be reluctant
to invest significantly in oil shale until all such lucrative opportunities
were fully exploited. 1
This point might become more clear by reference to Figure 4. Assuming
that U.S. prices are determined by world prices, as OPEC increases prices,
the U.S. supply would increase, demand would decrease, and imports would
decrease. By the time world prices reached the level required for shale oil
to be economically viable, the volume demanded from shale oil may well have
fallen to a very low level.
Third, the high oil and gas prices required for commercial competitiveness
of shale oil would also most probably result in the adoption of a large number
of end-use technologies with much higher efficiencies. This would cause a
substantial reduction in demand. The net result of the very high prices might
be that little shale oil would be demanded, even assuming zero imports.
Indications for this include the small number of bids for shale leases, the
decline in the unit prices of shale leases, the thin secondary market in
shale leases, the restricted R&D being conducted on shale oil recovery,
requests for suspension of lease payments, and the number of companies
abandoning their lease positions.
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4.3 BEHAVIOR TOWARD RISK
A further factor adding to the risk of private investment in shale oil
plants is the nature of the risk itself relative to prices. Reference to
Figure 5 might illustrate this point. An investor's perception of minimum
acceptable returns is determined, in part, by the "tail" to the right of the
curve. However, the only real possibility for large returns on shale oil
would be very high world oil prices; investor's perceptions are that
public pressure would block "large" returns (e.g., through excess
profits legislation). Therefore, the possibility of constraints on
the one hand without supports on the other raises the perceived risks of the
venture. It is not simply a matter of high variance, which can be handled
either through a large number of similar ventures or through diversification
of investments. Rather it is at least the perception that one side of the
probability curve may be arbitrarily cut off.
The question of absolute size and number of the individual investments
also highlights this point. Even a large shale oil industry (i.e., 5 MM B/D)
would require relatively few plants in total (i.e., 100), each costing some
1 1/2 billion dollars. It is difficult to apply probabilities, and even more
difficult to perceive them commercially, in such a limited number of such huge
investments. Even so, though, it might mean the formation of new organizational
structures and the delays resulting therefrom; if the profitability
were large enough, presumably the necessary capital would be available in
the long run.
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It requires little imagination to conjure up scenarios in which enormous
losses would be possible in the shale oil business. For example, the mean
value (as well as the variance) of capital costs may increase rather than de-
crease with each succeeding plant, as has been the case with nuclear plants.
Similarly, the absolute value (as well as the variance) of construction times
may increase, as mentioned above. This could result, for example, from
changing environmental knowledge which would lead to conditions requiring
each successive plant to be, in fact, new and different from its predecessors,
so that little learning could take place.
There are energy companies with positions in oil shale reserves and on-
going R&D efforts in the area. While the optimism of 1973 and 1974 regarding
shale oil has dwindled, there is still significant private sector interest.
Whatever government programs may or may not exist, each element of the private
sector must decide: shall I enter the shale oil business now or later or
never? If the perception could be built of a shale oil industry that would be
desirable to enter later, then some firms would be led thereby to enter it
now with commercial-size plants, for two reasons. First, early high risk
entry is a classical strategy toward a strong competitive position in a new
industry, especially if its barriers to entry are high. Secondly, there is
some impetus provided by the natural enthusiasm generated by a new technology,
and by what in some large firms might be considered "momentum" which would
seem to carry them from their present business into what they perceive as the
next logical step in the evolution of that business.
In addition, those companies already active in shale oil, and with
significant investment in it, have additional factors to consider: the incre-
mental investment required to proceed would be lower than for a newly entering
company. On the other hand, withdrawal now and reentry later would mean writing
off the present investment and perhaps having to repeat it later. Also, a
certain amount of personal and institutional pride is involved in carrying
through with a project, once it is started, especially one that involves
relatively exotic processing and high public visibility. However, given the
technological and economic uncertainties discussed in the previous section, it
currently seems doubtful that the private sector would undertake oil shale
processing on a commercial scale in the forseeable future without some form of
government assistance or some technological breakthrough. One possible break-
through worthy of mention is the in-situ recovery of oil from shale; presently
Occidental is actively conducting research in this direction. No information
is available on this work, but a significant cost breakthrough in this field
is presumably possible.
IShale Country, p. 9, July, 1976
5. MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE SYNTHETIC FUELS COMMERCIALIZATION PROGRAM
5.1 RATIONALES PROPOSED BY ERDA
The philosophy of government implicit in the demonstration proposal is that
government intervention in the economy should always be aimed at reducing
"market failures" and maximizing social good. The concept of market failures -
cases where private economic decisions lead to socially undesirable outcomes -
is discussed in Section 3.3 of the Issue Paper, and the reader is referred
there for a fuller discussion. In the case of oil shale, ERDA perceived the
following principal market failure: It is socially desirable for the U.S.
to reduce substantially its imports of crude oil by the year 2000. This
cannot be done without the development of a large oil shale industry, and
this development must begin now to be fully onstream by 2000. However,
private industry's current perception of the commercial possibilities of oil
shale is such that development will not begin as a result of market forces alone.
In general, ERDA expressed the view that the Synthetic Fuels Commercializa-
tion Program will reduce certain risks inherent in the shale oil industry.
It is believed that there is a high "first cost" associated with oil shale
technologies. Whether or not the proposed program could achieve significant
reductions of technological risks is a matter which could be debated, but
that is one of the areas ERDA felt the Synthetic Fuels Commercialization
Program addressed. Reduced technological risks would make shale oil more
"''Fact Book" op cit, pp. 1 - B2.
competitive. To the extent that these risk reductions represent non-appropriable
first costs, they are a "market imperfection". If there is, indeed, a
significant first cost, then the proposed program addresses that issue.1
As earlier sections of this report have indicated, oil shale processing is
fraught with potential environmental problems at every step of the way, from
mining the shale through disposal of the waste. Any commercial scale shale
oil industry will have to deal with many complex regulatory issues, not the
least of which is the question of water rights in an extremely arid part of
the country. The potentially costly delays that may be occasioned by regulatory
and environmental issues only compound the risks already associated with oil
shale processing, and make it less attractive for private investment. One of
the arguments presented by ERDA for a commercial demonstration plant is that
building such a plant would force the clarification of regulatory and
environmental issues, and thereby lessen the degree of risk associated with
further investment in the industry.2
Energy price instability is one of the principal deterrants to investment
in shale oil processing. The Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program does
not directly deal with this industry problem except by guaranteeing prices
for the demonstration plants--and, indeed, it cannot be expected to. ERDA,
however, felt that by lowering the "front-end" costs facing industry it would
offer an inducement that would partially counter the effect of price in-
stability, as well as deal with the high expected cost of shale relative to
its expected price.
Issue Paper, Section 3.3.2.
2
"Fact Book" op cit, p. B-2.
Some of the causes of the market failures perceived by the government and
discussed above might be gradually dealt with over time even without government
intervention in the form of support for commercial scale plants. It is
possible, for example, that some of the environmental and regulatory uncertain-
ties will have been resolved by the late 1980's. There is also evidence to
suggest that several of the current lease holders feel that free market
petroleum prices by 1990-2000 will be such that shale oil will be commercially
competitive. The issue that ERDA saw the Synthetic Fuels Commercialization
Program as addressing is, how does the industry get built between now and then?
By the time price trends are clear, it will be too late to begin development
of an industry that will have significant capacity on stream by 1995, ERDA's
target year for 5 MM B/D production of synfuels. Given that achievement of
this goal is socially desirable, then there is clearly a market failure if
the perceived risks exceed the true risks and prevent timely private invest-
ment in the needed capacity. By reducing some of the risks as described in
Section 6, the Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program is intended to
encourage such timely investment.
5.2 OTHER RATIONALES FOR THE SYNTHETIC FUELS COMMERCIALIZATION PROGRAM
Regardless of what costs and prices may be expected several decades in
the future, initial "front-end" costs have great relevance to a decision to
invest in a new technology. "Thus, ERDA's commercial demonstration programs
can be viewed somewhat crudely as subsidies or offsets to the introduction
stage--i.e., the excess of cost over production revenues during the introduction
stage". I
1
Issue Paper, op cit, p. 73.
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There is a socially perceived value to domestic production of fuels: there
is some cost per barrel that the U.S. is willing to pay if that barrel is pro-
duced domestically. We can think of this as a "national security premium", and
of the Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program as a way of paying some part
of that premium.
6. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED SYNTHETIC FUELS COMMERCIALIZATION
PROGRAM
6.1 ABILITY OF THE SYNTHETIC FUELS COMMERCIALIZATION PROGRAM TO DEAL WITH
PERCEIVED PROBLEMS
The Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program directly addresses four
problem areas:
A. Technological. To the extent that perceived technological problems
are real, the Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program is designed to provide
answers to relevant questions. A crucial point not determined is the degree
to which technological risk is a barrier, in the context of the other barriers
discussed herein.
One major technical uncertainty involves mining feasibility. This is,
however, a strong function of individual locations.
One of the greatest benefits of a demonstration project would be to
examine the retort scaling issues; if this were done on a number of the
different basic processes proposed, a better assessment could be made of the
competing processes, and better estimates made of both capital and operating
costs. It should be pointed out that an R&D project could also achieve these
goals. However, there is another dimension to the scaling issue that neither
R&D nor commercialization projects could illuminate. That is the fact that
4-6 50 M B/D shale oil plants would be required to provide the charge for
only one fair-sized refinery, each shale oil plant requiring huge solids-
handlings capabilities as earlier described. Transportation costs would
1Because of its very high pour-point and somewhat different composition,
shale oil should optimally be refined near the production facility.
increase to the point that they may no longer be a negligible proportion of
total costs, as they have been in the past. Such a change could have a
significant impact on the infrastructure of the energy industry, but this
impact could not be adequately estimated from a single commercialization
venture.
One potentially valuable piece of information obtainable from a
commercialization program but not from an R&D effort would be the probable
stream factor of similar oil shale plants. Because of the extreme capital
intensiveness, the stream factor assumes critical importance in assessing pro-
duction costs.
B. Environmental and Regulatory. One of the aims of the demonstration
plant program is to resolve uncertainties about environmental and regulatory
issues by, in effect, forcing them. While it is probable that building one
or two plants might end some of the uncertainty (though the cost-effectiveness
of building commercial-size plants to obtain such knowledge, compared to say,
research, should be considered), it is also probable that some key regulatory
and technical problems would not surface until several shale oil plants had
been built. In particular, water supply systems which might be adequate for
future plant(s) would most definitely be totally inadequate for future plants.
Shale disposal techniques appropriate for one or two plants might well become
totally unacceptable for fifty or a hundred plants.
A partial list of key regulatory and environmental factors follows:
1. Air Pollution - Ambient levels violate EPA standards at the present
and standards may become stricter.
2. Water - The impact of extensive mine dewatering is unknown. It
could have either favorable or unfavorable impacts on Colorado water quality.
The available supplies of local water may be sufficient for the first few
plants - water will have to be imported for more plants. Legal and regulatory
bottlenecks abound in this area.
3. Shale Disposal - The nature of the environmental impact of large
scale shale disposal is predictably large and to some degree unquantified.
Certain processes (in-situ, multi-mineral) require less disposal.
4. Health and Safety - In all probability, no bottlenecks exist.
However, regulations are complex and permits are numerous.
5. General Regulations - Huge amounts of general regulation and permit
requirements exist at the Federal, state, and local level.
6. Population Influx - Large influx of population will result from
large scale shale development. No mechanism yet exists to adequately handle
this problem.
It is not at all clear that research programs directed at understanding
the regulatory environment coupled to technical programs to assess the en-
vironmental risks could not more efficiently resolve the various issues, if
coupled with a government effort to achieve such a result. It is, in fact,
highly likely that exceptions or waivers would be granted for the first
"commercialization'' plants that would not be available for future plants.
This would, of course, leave the issues completely unresolved.
C. Prices. Prices are a barrier to a shale oil industry in three ways:
First, present price estimates for shale oil vary from Ix to 3x present world
oil prices. Therefore, a viable industry depends upon a significant increase in
world oil prices in the future. Second, future world oil prices are expected to
be highly unstable, and be partially driven by non-economic factors. Third, the
existence of and the possibility of continued U.S. price controls on energy add
a separate dimension of uncertainty.
The existence of OPEC as a "non-commercial" or non-market driven competitor
makes energy pricing far less predictable than if only economic or competitive
factors were involved. From the standpoint of sheer energy availability, OPEC
clearly dominates the free world and every nation in it for the present and the
next few years (with the possible exception of Mexico, Great Britain, and Norway).
In economic terms the OPEC nations operate from a cost base several orders of
magnitude below any new energy source, and may be driven at least as strongly by
non-economic forces (e.g., political) as by economic ones. Large segments of OPEC,
such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, can "afford", in economic terms, to be driven by
these non-economic forces, and thus the future world oil price will be in part
determined by them. The point here is that OPEC, though heterogeneous and not a
true cartel, by its very existence, introduces great uncertainties and risks in
the future of world oil prices.
Culturally and politically, the OPEC policy and decision makers have
considerable insultation in terms of accountability or responsiveness,
especially in the short term, compared to policy and decision makers who must
answer to investors or to an electorate. Therefore, OPEC is relatively free,
The current proposal, which is not to control the shale oil price, but let it
equate to world oil price, would remove this uncertainty to the extent that
industry believed price controls might not be reimposed at a later date.
if it so chooses, to make decisions within very long time horizons, enabling
OPEC to use world oil prices as a policy tool in meeting their own goals.
As a result we are familiar with neither the context within which nor the
dynamics by which future prices will in fact be determined.
The Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program deals directly with none
of these factors. It does strive to reduce the cost of the first plants
to the industry, but unfortunately even a successful program will probably
not reduce future industry costs to the extent necessary to override the
cost factors cited above. (All proposals for "price guarantees" are for
demonstration plants only, with no intention of applying such guarantees to
succeeding plants.) 1
D. Timing. One way of describing the government's proposed approach is
that the officials who put together its programs and their justifications
believe synfuels will eventually be profitable in a free market, but if their
development were left to the private sector, a transition period of low
energy volumes and corresponding high prices would transpire, which would be
socially unacceptable. The commercial demonstration program is intended
only to shorten this transition period and thus prevent the high prices.
Given the present technology, it is clear that a viable synfuels industry
depends on the maintenance of high oil prices. It is significant to note
that ERDA is aware of issues of the long term commercial viability of the
synfuel industry, and points out, for instance, the dire consequences--
"... under the very pessimistic assumption that oil prices fall to $7 per
barrel."* However, in the context of the energy problem, it is not clear
how the U.S. government--let alone the energy consumer--could consider the
fall of the (world) market price of oil as "pessimistic". It would seem,
rather, that, although such a price level would certainly invalidate synfuels
economically, its implications for the entire energy problem would be far
more significant.
* "Fact Book", op cit. p. G-4. Emphasis added.
The dilemma is, how can the private sector afford to operate commercialization
plants (or their replications) until and unless those prices rise to the
point that shale oil is competitive.
E. Visibility and Bigness. There is reasonable cause for concern in
the private sector about the possibility of regulation of absolute firm size
and profitability, especially in view of the likely high visibility of the
shale business. However, the shale oil industry will require large, profit-
able companies for it to be the rapidly growing industry it must be to
produce significant quantities of shale oil within the next decade or two.
6.2 EVALUATION OF INCENTIVES INCLUDED IN THE SYNTHETIC FUELS COMMERCIALIZATION
PROGRAM
The Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program attempts to reduce the
potential effects of risks inherent in oil shale processing by guaranteeing
construction loans and providing price supports for refined shale oil for a
limited number of commercialization plants.
A. Loan Guarantees. In addition to clouding the costs of the product
(see Issue Paper, Section 4.4.3) it is not clear that loan guarantees would
offer significant incentives to the huge firms that would be expected to be
instrumental in the development of the shale oil industry, despite industry
statements apparently to the contrary. A large, established, respectable
company may not in fact be willing to default on a loan, even though it might
be able to legally, which would make government guarantees of little or no
value to them. However, this would not apply to smaller companies, and loan
See Issue Paper, Section 4.4.3.
guarantees could well reduce their cost of capital and/or make capital
more readily available to them.
Furthermore, as discussed in the Issue Paper, loan guarantees can dis-
tort patterns of future investment in a facility, and encourage high risk
technology and operating procedures, which might not be the most appropriate
direction for the industry that is expected to follow the lead set by the
commercial demonstration. On the other hand, "risk-encouragement", should it
occur, may simply compensate for the risk-aversion postulated as a synfuels
market failure.
Various methods of calculating the value of the lump sum subsidy that
a loan guarantee represent suggests that the value of a loan guarantee is
approximately equivalent to a lump sum payment of one-half of the amount
guaranteed.
B. Price Supports. In general, guaranteed prices, as suggested in the
Issue Paper (Section 4.4.2.v), leave the private firm a certain latitude in
the design and operation of the demonstration plant. There is, however, some
question about the efficacy of this instrument in the energy sector, as long
as prices are perceived to be volatile. A guarantee puts a floor under
prices, but it also puts a ceiling on them; should the market price of shale
oil rise above the guaranteed price, then shale oil producers will, in effect,
receive only the guaranteed price.1
Since the incentives (properly) would only apply to the first few
commercial-size plants, they do not speak to the long range problem of high
expected costs relative to expected prices.
Few, if any, proposals (including that in HR12112) provide a guaranteed
price minimum, but rather a guaranteed price.
7. CONCLUSION
The Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program assumes 1) that
technological risk is a major barrier to entry into shale oil processing and
2) that it can be significantly reduced by limited commercial scale demonstra-
tion. Somewhat the same assumptions are made about environmental and
regulatory risks. In both of these cases, it can be argued that there are
problems of scale that would be peculiar to a shale oil industry, but that
would not be apparent in only a few demonstration plants.
The Synthetic Fuels Commercialization Program strives to reduce price
uncertainty by guaranteeing prices for the products of the demonstration
plants. It does not touch upon the larger problem; namely, the effect of
continuing price instability (which uncertainty is accentuated as long as
world oil price is set by OPEC) on the presumably non-price guaranteed
industry that is to follow commercial demonstration, especially in view of
the fact that expected costs are high relative to expected prices.
It is reasonable to assume that the Synthetic Fuels Commercialization
Program will encourage investment in shale oil
level. However, unless world oil prices rise
technological break-through occurs, oil shale
as uneconomical; the oil shale "industry" will
demonstration plants and nothing more.
The problem areas that the Synthetic Fuel
does not address raise further questions about
account seems to be taken of the implications
"desired" shale oil industry: the commercial
processing at the demonstration
substantially or a major
will continue to be perceived
consist of the subsidized
s Commercialization Program
its advisability. No adequate
of the large size of the
risks will be huge and domestic
political pressure is likely to be generated by its sheer "bigness".
In light of these shortcomings, it would appear that the Synthetic Fuels
Commercialization Program would be ineffective in developing a shale oil
industry. If development of such an industry is still felt to be a desirable
national goal, a more effective program should be devised, more comprehensive
and more convincingly responsive to the economics of the energy sector. The
question would remain whether some future policy development would be worth
its cost. One option that should be worth investigation would be the
exploration of in-situ technology, which presumably has the possibility of
significant cost break-throughs, where none seem apparent for above-ground
retorting.
For emphasis, however, it should be noted that a very low cost (relative
to world oil prices) for in-situ shale oil would probably indicate no govern-
ment commercialization is required, for incentives would be great enough for
the private sector to pursue it vigorously without government support under
the criteria set forth in the official studies. Commercialization programs
are justifiable only in that narrow band where the industry is viable but
the first few plants are not. Above-ground retorting of shale oil falls
outside this band simply because expected costs are too high. At some lower
cost, a commercialization program would be appropriate; at some still lower
cost (i.e., $4.00/B), a commercialization program would not be needed.
